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From: TSS ()
Subject: OIE TAHCC meeting October 2006 prior to next CC meeting March 2007 for consideration in the 75th General Session to be held in May 2007
Date: January 26, 2007 at 12:07 pm PST

Draft written comments of the Community on on the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code Commission meeting October 2006 prior to the next Code Commission meeting March 2007 for consideration in the 75th General Session to be held in May 2007


snip...

10. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy

a) Risk assessment recommendations (Appendix 3.8.5.)

Among a substantial number of comments suggesting modifications and better

linkage to Chapter 2.3.13., the Terrestrial Code Commission recognised it should

first address a comment from New Zealand requesting clarification of the purpose of

EN 11 EN

this Appendix in relation to a set of guidelines titled “BSE Questionnaire for country

status recognition” prepared by the Scientific Commission. The OIE has agreed to

conduct procedures to recognise the BSE status of Member Countries. In view of

this, the Terrestrial Code Commission was of the opinion that Appendix 3.8.5. on

factors to consider in conducting BSE risk assessment should be incorporated,

without further review by the Terrestrial Code Commission, into the documents used

for the official OIE categorisation of Member Countries.

Once such guidelines become available to Member Countries on the OIE website or

otherwise, the Terrestrial Code Commission will propose to Member Countries that

current Appendix 3.8.5. be dropped from the Terrestrial Code. It was agreed that any

detailed and very prescriptive documents should not be part of the Terrestrial Code.

b) Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 2.3.13.)

Community comments:

The Community welcomes the work done by the Code Commission but strongly opposes

to the modification made related to the production of gelatine and ask the OIE Code

Commission to reconsider its position prior to the General Session in May 2007.

In addition the Community would welcome the OIE Code Commission to consider the

other comments made on the Chapter 2.3.13. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

Some Member Countries requested clarification of the term “imported” appearing in

Article 2.3.13.2. point a) Release assessment. The Terrestrial Code Commission was

of the view that this should be addressed in Chapter 1.3.5. as it is a general

consideration in implementation of zone and compartment.

The Terrestrial Code Commission examined outstanding concerns raised by the EU

and Japan regarding the risk of potentially infected animals present in the age cohorts

born before the risk management measures were enforced. As a result, Articles

2.3.13.6., 2.3.13.7. and 2.3.13.12. were modified.

The Terrestrial Code Commission was informed by the EU that an article from

French scientists (D. Calavas, V. Supervie, E. Morignat, D. Costagliola & C. Ducrot)

has been accepted for publication in the Journal on Risk Analysis and will be

published very soon. This document will provide the scientific rationale for changes

made to the compliance period (i.e. the period of 7 years from the reporting of the

case changed to 11 years from the birth of the case - Article 2.3.13.3. paragraph 3 b).

A Member Country requested to exclude the transverse processes of the thoracic and

lumbar vertebrae and the wings of the sacrum from the definition of the vertebral

column in point 2 of Article 2.3.13.13. The Terrestrial Code Commission did not

adopt this recommendation because it doubted if the proposed definitions would be

universally practicable or enforceable.

EN 12 EN

The Terrestrial Code Commission examined comments from a Member Country

regarding the safety of gelatine irrespective of the origin of source material due to the

safety of the production process. Based on the supporting document and a risk

assessment recently published by the New Zealand Food Safety Authority (NZFSA,

2005, Wellington) and entitled “Officials’ Review of New Zealand’s BSE Country-

Categorisation Measure” (http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/imported-food/bsecategorisation/

report/index.htm), the Terrestrial Code Commission decided to revise

Article 2.3.13.14. to allow all cattle bones to be used as a source material for the

production of gelatine, provided the cattle have passed ante-mortem and post-mortem

inspections.

The revised chapter, which is presented at Appendix IX, is circulated among

Member Countries for comment.

c) Surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Appendix 3.8.4.)

The Terrestrial Code Commission examined comments received from Member

Countries on this Appendix. Noting that some questions remain on the usage of the

full BSurvE model instead of Appendix 3.8.4., the Terrestrial Code Commission


reiterated its intention as follows: Appendix 3.8.4. was developed using a modified

version of the BSurvE model so that it would be easily applicable to any Member

Country. However, the Terrestrial Code Commission does not see any problem in a

Member Country choosing to use the full BSurvE model to estimate its BSE

presence/prevalence. The reason why Appendix 3.8.4. does not make any reference

to the BSurvE model as an alternative method is that the concept of equivalence

underpins all chapters of the Terrestrial Code.

The Terrestrial Code Commission did not adopt country recommendations to modify

descriptions of cattle sub-populations, as those used in the Appendix are consistent

with commonly used terminology. The Terrestrial Code Commission did not adopt a

request to expand Table 1 (Appendix 3.8.4.) to provide a more detailed breakdown of

cattle sub-populations because it considered that additional detail and complexity

would not be helpful. Member Countries wishing to apply a more expanded version

for BSE surveillance can use the BSurvE model.

d) Supporting document

The Terrestrial Code Commission received a fully revised supporting document on

BSE prepared by a group of experts. The document was commissioned to provide

supporting scientific evidence for recent changes made to the chapter on BSE. All

Commission members expressed their sincere appreciation to the experts who

contributed to the drafting of the report.

The supporting document, which is presented at Appendix XXVIII, is circulated

among Member Countries for information.

snip...

http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/ah_pcad_oie563207_en.pdf

WHAT ABOUT BASE ???

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.

snip...

64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that in a
mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of prion
disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after infection.


http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf


3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the Exhibit
Hall


3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse


Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve
University

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to
be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is
transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE in humans.

6:30 Close of Day One


http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp


SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM
1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...


http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance
collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf


THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;


CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006


The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier
this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to
them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest
case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at
least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA
officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a
picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is
thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they
consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal,
incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated
with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the
National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System
Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press
International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer
that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before
one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow
that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end


http://www.upi.com/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central
Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room
4A-05, ...


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm


Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006


PERSPECTIVE


On the Question of Sporadic or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease


Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§

Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require

systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries

considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,

or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in

countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.

To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence

of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the

annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

[CJD] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million

randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and

sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory

studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.

Such a link might yet be established by the discovery

of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations

of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various

subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced

by a continuation of current public health measures that

exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and

human food chains.


SNIP...


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e

O.I.E. .......... ??? GOD HELP US!


sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i
am not mistaken. MOST countries that went

by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS


http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf


THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.

AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country

makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures.

IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

Page 95 of 98

8/3/2006

WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs, WITH RELATIONS TO
SRMs ???

a.. BSE OIE

see full text ;

http://p079.ezboard.com/fwolftracksproductionsfrm2.showMessage?topicID=470.topic


IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH

et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept, either through ignorance and or just too overweight

with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this

ongoing problem ?


please see full text 98 pages ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=20678

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&I=-3&P=3381

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


THE BSE MRR policy is a policy that was implemented and put forth for the sole purpose of commodities and futures,

it was nothing more than a legal tool to trade BSE and other strains of TSE globally, because that is exactly what has taken place.

THERE WAS nothing science based about it. PLUS, the OIE has still failed to access CWD in deer and elk of what the ramifications

will be if and when it is documented as a zoonotic disease. I was told some years ago (5) by an official at OIE that this would

take place soon. still waiting. ...

Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 2006, 25 (1), 83-92

A history of biological disasters

of animal origin in North America

http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2501/PDF/06-ackerman83-91.pdf

Risk analysis of prion diseases in animals
Preface

Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 2003, 22 (1), 7-12 pdf

This special issue of the Scientific and Technical Review returns to a topic that was first reviewed by the journal in June 1992, five years after bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was first described and the same year that the epidemic reached its peak in the United Kingdom (UK). Although the BSE epidemic in the UK and in some other countries of Europe has subsided and entered a protracted elimination stage, the disease has been detected in fourteen other countries and has triggered some unparalleled actions to protect animal and human health. Furthermore, the repercussions of the epidemic continue to be felt throughout the world.

The present review is necessary because the history of BSE is a prime example of how to deal with uncertainty and how control measures are based on the best possible knowledge at a given time. Great advances have been made in the scientific understanding of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and prions since 1992 and have led to innovations in the diagnosis and management of these diseases. Rapid diagnostic tests are one example. Progress in the underlying science of the TSEs has been monumental since 1992.

The BSE experience has shown the great value of risk analysis in guiding a rational approach to animal disease control within countries and on the world scene. Risk analysis and the resulting standards of the OIE International Animal Health Code have provided the world with benchmarks for managing the risk of BSE and at the same time maintaining trade. However, risk analysis is not static and must be informed by advances in science in order to ensure topicality, quality and validity.

Hindsight may show whether the control measures flowing from risk analysis were either adequate or inadequate and proportionate or disproportionate in regard to the risks linked to BSE. The abiding lesson from BSE may, however, be the value of risk analysis as an evolving tool for dealing with certainties and uncertainties as knowledge unfolds. One of the functions of the OIE is to ensure that risk analysis and the resulting OIE Code standards do this very thing and can provide a means for harmony on animal health matters throughout the world. The present issue of the Review will provide working material not only for this hindsight but also for foresight in the form of risk assessment.

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is the archetype for a class of emerging zoonotic diseases that may arise through factors in animal husbandry. Although the effects of the disease on cattle are sufficient alone to make it a major concern, its causal link with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in people places it on a higher plane of dread and fear compared with virtually every other disease of animals. This causal link was unclear when the Review examined the topic of the TSEs in 1992. Furthermore, BSE has cast a shadow on other contemporary TSEs in animals: scrapie in sheep and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer. What exactly are the public health implications from these two diseases?

Deep inroads into confidence about the safety of the human food supply have been created by BSE which has led to a range of food safety laws and policies in various countries. These actions may have been necessary but it must be emphasised that ultimate and decisive control of the public health risk from BSE lies in control measures applied to animals. These control measures will be most effective if they are informed by systematic risk analysis and permanent updating of the Code.

Fear and dread about BSE is said to have reduced confidence about the value of science in dealing problems in the living world. This drop in confidence may be true and the polemics surrounding BSE are unprecedented. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile reflecting upon the dire course of events if sound epidemiological investigations had not occurred in the UK, if a series of experiments to clarify key unknowns had not been initiated, if the weight of the world’s scientific research capacity had not been brought to bear on the problems, if the painstaking processes of risk assessment had not been undertaken and if there had not been well established international forums such as the OIE to co-ordinate international effort and cooperation.

Progress in understanding the complexities of the biology of the TSEs has been astounding since 1992 and has shown the immense value of comparative medicine in action. As a consequence, there is a dawning hope that TSEs could be removed as a problem at some time in the future. The proviso is that current efforts are not relaxed and that the TSEs continue to be treated with the seriousness they deserve. To this end, the OIE will persist with its tasks of guaranteeing the transparency of the animal disease status world-wide, collecting, analysing and disseminating veterinary scientific information, providing expertise and promoting international solidarity for the control of animal diseases and zoonoses, while guaranteeing the sanitary safety of world trade by developing sanitary standards for international trade in animals and animal products.

Bernard Vallat
Director General

http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/RT/2201/A_R2210.htm

Chronic Wasting Disease

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/

vCJD USA THIRD CASE DOCUMENTED

http://vcjd.blogspot.com/

BSE ATYPICAL USA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/

SCRAPIE USA

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/

vCJD transfusion-asso.Fourth Case UK

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/

vCJD case study highlights blood transfusion risk

http://vcjdblood.blogspot.com/

Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME

http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/

MADCOW DISEASE USA SPONTANEOUS OR FEED ?

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/

TSS





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