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From: TSS ()
Subject: APRIL 1-5 2006 BSE ALABAMA UPDATE
Date: April 5, 2006 at 2:18 pm PST

APRIL 1-5 2006 BSE ALABAMA UPDATE


APRIL FOOLS !!!


April 3 4,and 5, 2006
There is nothing new to report and the investigation continues.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml


out of sight, out of mind, maybe there hoping we'll forget about it. ...TSS

Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan
Summary
Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas......

I thought it might be interesting for those of you who have not seen
this plan, to do so. So here it is...........

The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance
the quality of life for the American people by supporting production
agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible
food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands;
supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic
opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for
agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce
hunger in America and throughout the world.

USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible
for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves
agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the
national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's
meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome,
unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies
have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring,
and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S.
livestock and food supply.
The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human
cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE
as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United
Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected
international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health
communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S.
Government's accountability for a safe food supply.
No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989,
USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE
from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive
interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program
allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in
the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States.
Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency
preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be
initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United
States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to
who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be
diagnosed in the United States.

BACKGROUND

APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal
disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a
step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease,
such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often
referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain
actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect
animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal
and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific
FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each
regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.

In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in
the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group
updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research
surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially
entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES.
The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which
detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an
emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement
by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent
to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication
issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and
externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect
such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food
animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public
health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate
information readily available would build trust and credibility and
facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a
notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when,
and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as
to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate
information.
The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE
Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE
Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of
backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety,
public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public
affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from
APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their
respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE.
Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited,
revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and
USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such
as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition.
The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and
research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for
ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised
and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.

NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities

Surveillance

As part of USDA's surveillance program for BSE in the United States,
veterinary pathologists and field investigators from APHIS and FSIS have
received training from British counterparts in diagnosing BSE. FSIS
inspects cattle before they go to slaughter; these inspection procedures
include identifying animals with central nervous system conditions.
Animals with such conditions are considered suspect for BSE, prohibited
from slaughter, and referred to APHIS for examination as explained
below.
Pathologists at APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)
histopathologically examine the brains from these condemned animals. In
addition, samples are tested using a technique called
immunohistochemistry, which tests for the presence of the
protease-resistant prion protein (a marker for BSE). NVSL also examines
samples from neurologically ill cattle and nonambulatory ("DOWNER")
cattle identified on the farm or at slaughter and from rabies-negative
cattle submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories and teaching
hospitals.

NOTIFICATION

Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect
animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the
notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the
activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is
submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the
first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to
either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is
determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to
the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains
these data.
If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL
pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for
confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a
diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United
Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the
preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.

Prelimanary Notification

The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS,
Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a
presumptive diagnosis of BSE.
Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field
activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification
(either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United
Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal
health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary
Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE.
Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this
lab to confirm their first case of BSE).

NVSL

NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE
Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its
facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect
animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also
coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic
laboratories if necessary.

APHIS, VS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

Veterinary Services is the animal health arm of APHIS and the program
responsible for carrying out field actions in response to BSE. Upon
notifiction of a presumptive diagnosis from NVSL, the APHIS, VS deputy
administrator immediately notifies the FSIS, Office of Public Health and
Science (OPHS) deputy administrator. APHIS and FSIS deputy
administrators will alert the BSE Response Team and activate the
Response Plan. The VS deputy administrator serves as the liaison between
the BSE Response Team and the APHIS administrator.
The APHIS, VS deputy administrator notifies the APHIS administrator and
the VS regional director of the State from which the suspect animal
originated.

APHIS Administrator

The APHIS Administrator immediately notifies the USDA Assistant
Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs. This immediate
notification will be followed by an official informational memorandum
from the APHIS Administrator, through the Assistant Secretary for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, to the Secretary of Agriculture. This
memorandum will be prepared by the BSE Response Team; a draft is
maintained by the Team leaders in the reserved section of their plans.
The APHIS Administrator is responsible for securing indemnity funds for
depopulation of the herd if CVL confirms NVSL's diagnosis.

Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs

The Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, in
conjuction with the Undersecretary for Food Safety, is responsible for
notifying the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary serves as the liaison
between APHIS and Department-level officials.

Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary has the authority to declare a Federal EMERGENCY if
appropriate and approve funding as necessary. Information will be
provided to the Secretary up the chain of command from the BSE Response
Team.

FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator

The OPHS Deputy Administrator, together with the APHIS, VS Deputy
Administrator, alert the BSE Response Team leaders and instruct them to
assemble the BSE Response Team and activate the Plan. The OPHS Deputy
Administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and
the FSIS Administrator.
The OPHS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the FSIS
regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal
originated.

FSIS Deputy Administrator

The FSIS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the
Undersecretary for Food Safety.

Undersecretary for Food Safety

The Undersecretary for Food Safety, in conjuction with the Assistant
Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, notifies the Secretary
of Agriculture.

APHIS, VS, Regional Director

The APHIS, VS regional director in charge of the State from which the
suspect animal originated notifies the VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge
(AVIC) for that State. The regional director is the liaison between VS
field staff and the VS Deputy Administrator at headquarters. In
addition, the regional director shares all information with the BSE
Response Team.

APHIS, VS, AVIC

The VS AVIC, in cooperation with State animal health authorities, is
responsible for coordination the field activities surrounding the
emergency response to BSE. The AVIC assembles the local VS staff to
initiate activities outlined in the BSE Red Book including tracing the
progeny and herdmates of the suspect animal and beginning an
epidemiologic investigation. The VS AVIC coordinates with the State
Veterinarian to quarantine the suspect animal's herd of origin. The
State has the authority to order a routine quarantine for a neurological
disease. The BSE Response Team surveyed every State to determine if they
would utilize this authority in the event that NVSL identifies a
presumptive diagnosis of BSE. All States responded that they would issue
a quarantine.

BSE Response Team

The BSE Response Team leaders will notify each team member and instruct
them to assemble in the Situation Room at APHIS headquarters in
Riverdale, MD. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that all of
the Team's duties are fulfilled. It is their responsibility to ensure
that the technical information and expert recommendations reach the
decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Together with VS Emergency Programs
staff, the Team leaders will obtain APHIS, VS administrative support
staff in Riverdale, MD, to ready the room for use as BSE headquarters.
The Team will begin gathering and assembling information from APHIS and
FSIS region and field staff. The Team will pull the draft documents from
the third section in the Team leaders manuals and begin filling in
current information as it becomes available.

Public Notification

Should NVSL receive notice from CVL confirming a case of BSE, the next
level of notification is activated. Each player will follow the same
notification protocol as described above for preliminary notification to
confirm the diagnosis of a case of BSE.

BSE Response Team

The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the
Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of
International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health
organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE
requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours
of confirming a diagnosis of BSE.
The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy
Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS
regional directors and AVIC'S.
The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy
Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional
and field FSIS offices.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other
Federal agencies.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key
industry/consumer representatives.
The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify
foreign embassies.
The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for
industry representatives, reporters, and the public.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public
Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the
day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press
conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......

THE END

BSE Red Book 2.1-35

7.0 Emergency Operations

The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is
confirmed in the United States.

7.1 READEO Activation

READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different
from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is
not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be
transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely
long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals
or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread
rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should
not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel.
READEO activation should be considered only if the particular
circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they
are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to
their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will
evaluate the need for READEO activation.

7.2 READEO Organization

If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO
Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.

7.2.1 Office of the Director
When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are
responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to
the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is
coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak.
7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the
Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors
since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented
in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian.
7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the
Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison
between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters.
7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans,
develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the
READEO.
7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the
READEO.
7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior
line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the
READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison
between the Depart-

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-36

ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed
military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak.
7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry
Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will
designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide
liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection
Operations.
7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer
will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and
appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed
results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with
interpretation of results.

7.2.2 Administration
The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and
coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the
revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and
responsibilities.

7.2.3 Field Operations
The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise
field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology,
disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and
quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials,
depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this
person's responsibilities.

7.2.4 Technical Support
Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act
as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are
not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas:
animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics,
environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and
training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs
of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director
as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS.
7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable
about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane
methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to
animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field
operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in
the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry.
7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and
other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife
policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation.
Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible
wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife
Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be
included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers
maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement
officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting
surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-37

area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and
coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary
to eliminate the disease.

7.3 Supplies and Equipment

During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained
through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated,
supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement
and Supply Officer.

7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines
Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.

7.4 Personnel Responsibilities

During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued
through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel
should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of
individual responsibilities.

7.4.1 Personnel
Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable
for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order
replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs
through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses
to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO
Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and
submitted promptly.

7.4.2 Travel
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and
preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per
diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO
Administrative Officer for processing.

7.4.3 Vehicles
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating,
cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They
also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services.
Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.

7.4. 4 Clothing
Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to
wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is
suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are
responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-38

In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a
commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and
practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to
whom it is assigned.

7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities
Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a
professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should
be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.

All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE
should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State
regulations.

7.5.1 Appraisal Teams
Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the
Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State
authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a
VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a
professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either
the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals.
No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed
by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the
owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause
concerning liens and mortgages.
When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value
of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may
negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance
from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect
should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any
existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but
ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE
suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a
professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS,
Emergency Programs staff.
If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos
must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of
replacement value.
Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to
be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients
must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to
remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials
should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-39

7.6 Depopulation Procedures

7.6.1 Factors and Considerations
If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects
will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease
problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or
rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no
circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering.
Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed
animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS,
Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of
euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.

7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods
Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there
are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents.
Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and
only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be
performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not
be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS
Memo 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for
euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and
because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms
are not an acceptable euthanasia method.
7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines
established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a
regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and
administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian
having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S.
Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for
euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS
Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)

7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation
Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without
explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO
Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)

7. 6.4 Permits for Movement
All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical
treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal.
Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and
will be administered by the State or Federal officials.

7. 6. 5 Security
Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease
security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal
disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm
visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the
responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-40

7.7 Disposal
Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or
rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a
BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be
transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or
field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has
been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been
obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass.
Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that
must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be
consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be
considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may
consider other disposal methods.

7.7.1 Incineration
Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred
disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local
environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and
permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS,
field personnel should investigate the location and availability of
incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass.
Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university
diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and
private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the
pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities.
The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the
diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for
transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should
inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer
of these arrangements.
Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by
rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS
suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis
of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent
to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the
carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing.
Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the
farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal
site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.

7.7.2 Burial
If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of
BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field
personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning
Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on
this method.
The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic
laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The
site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas,
not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly
protected.

October 1998


BSE Red Book 2.1-41

Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from
underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface
water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in
locating a satisfactory site.
Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO
Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are
normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per
adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet
of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation
may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.

7.7.3 Rendering
Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and
confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material
is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or
carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.

7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods
The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may
recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for
approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and
approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State
and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.

7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)

Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is
required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious
diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they
are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis
of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by
numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact,
have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure,
bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and
equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not
specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control
other diseases that may be present.

7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting
7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D
of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive
diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of
the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible,
field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If
circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm,
personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing
the work.
7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected
premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the
farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-42

7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE
suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally
accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After
conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed
on the sides and floor of the truck bed.
7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock
markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market,
it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of
the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive
diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the
suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due
to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any
pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and
disinfected.
Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE.
However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of
other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held.
7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal
protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor
rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be
managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.

7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants
Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a
disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent
include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution
containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This
should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is
in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include
previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible
with BSE than with any other neurologic disease.
If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as
rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke"
may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec.
1.4.4.)

7. 8. 3 Precautions
All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the
environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed.
Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also
corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible
materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are
used on metallic items.
Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes,
and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate
clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn
during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are
exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water.
Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety
Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or
if there is accidental release into the environment.

October l998

BSE Red Book 2.1-43

Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing
and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when
leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel
should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that
day.

7.9 Vector Control

Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.

7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy

The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence
of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE
agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and
included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many
animals to be exposed.
Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation
of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine
the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to
eradicate the disease.
7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent
contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any
infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken
to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to
prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds.
7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary
route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat
and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep
carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings
suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately
1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of
transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of
apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive
exotic ruminants.
7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects
should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated
in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances
should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium
hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium
hydroxide solution).
7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of
BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines,
tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the
production of biologics and drugs.
The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes.
Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum
safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the
manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be
considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the
tissue or organ from which the product is derived.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-44

7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are
not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not
necessary to prevent BSE.
7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary.
7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects
must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a
suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer
to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.)
7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE.
7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not
be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should
adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because
of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be
taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive
fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries
with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based
upon scientific risk assessment.
7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable
immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable
option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's.
7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated
environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that
pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected.
The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium
hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas
be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also
should be cleaned and disinfected.
7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an
intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to
ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which
prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.

7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak

The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a
computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly
during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the
READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of
containing and eradicating the disease.
For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a
READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations
should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and
enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology.
Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is
of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future
disease-eradication

October 1998

BSE Red book 2.1-45

programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will
be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and
equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports
and summaries of activities.

7.11.1 Daily Reporls
Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director
and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F
for current telephone listings.)
Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:

*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found;
*Inventory of feeds and feed sources;
*Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals;
*Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and,
Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization
of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and
equip­ment at the end of the program.

7.11.2 Distribution
The VS, Emergency Programs staff will distribute reports of significant
activities to all AVIC's, State cooperators, and industry cooperators at
least weekly. As soon as significant events occur, Emergency Programs
will inform all APHIS

will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting
channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any
significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately
advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically
important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication
activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.

7.11.3 Disposition
Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program
has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from
the records.
Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal
action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually,
administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit
purposes.

THE END. ...TSS

Approved-By: Siegfried.Schmitt@RZ.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
References:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Message-ID: <37319407.20422C9@wt.net>
Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 08:07:19 -0500
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: Re: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room

Dr. Pringle or Anyone, why is it, in the U.S.'s B.S.E. Response Plan, the U.S.D.A. refers to it as a FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE. With the feeding and rendering practices of the U.S. over the years, scrapie in the U.S. for years, (it was proven in the defense of Oprah Winfrey trial that neurologically ill cattle went to the renderers showed pictures of sheep heads in 55 gallon drums, along with all kind of road-kill at the rendering plants.)
Why do they call this a Foreign Disease, or a U.K. disease???
Under the circumstances, could it not happen here, because of OUR OWN STUPIDITY???
I also find it odd, that the letters, of the announcement of the first case of BSE, are already drafted and ready to go, for a disease, they say, can't happen here, because of the EXTENSIVE B.S.E. program that has been in place for years.
Under the present circumstances, out of the 900 MILLION cattle raised since 1990, and the examination of ONLY 7,535 brains since 1990, It would have to be a FREAK ACCIDENT, for the U.S. to ever find a case of B.S.E.
I believe, this could be a WORLD PROBLEM, AND COULD HAPPEN ANYWHERE, where the feeding and rendering practices were that of the U.K. or U.S.//////

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas, U.S.A.

tom wrote:

> i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing a james bond-type US effort to control media

=======================================================

Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800
From: tom
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing
a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated
first case of BSE in the US be admitted.

'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all
over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an
underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the
Assistant Secretary of Marketing.

Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a
few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate
document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.

Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team
assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes
14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL
have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a
provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are
they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary
Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to
96 hour turn-around.

I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday
despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar
brains from NE Colorado too.

A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and
www.mad-cow.org (among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The
Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group
turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and
Dealler's.

After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading
partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets
opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press
conference will be held the next day.

There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the
renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the
state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states),
expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media
800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many
other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I
will try to scan it in tomorrow.

In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first
hears about it.

The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this
is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your
strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of
Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure
in this case.

USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo
animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system"
and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think
this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many
thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and
France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows,
anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal.
Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.

Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red
Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases
that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so
lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news
that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days,
depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart
events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the
Indiana case a year or two back.

The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations
fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow
disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to
prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in
1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with
mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different
kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first
case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know
and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.

tom

=============================================

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Approved-By: Nora E Wineland
Message-ID: <"990528151900Z.WT26810.
14*/PN=Nora.E.Wineland/OU=APHISNOTES/O=APHIS/PRMD=GOV+USDA/ADMD=ATTMAIL/C=US/"@MHS>
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 09:05:10 -0600
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
From: Nora E Wineland
Subject: More on the USDA:APHIS BSE Response plan

I would like to add some more information from APHIS in response to some recent postings to the list:

Tom Pringle suggests that the 27 member team he labels as the "BSE swat team" be directed at TSE science and education. I would like to clarify that of the APHIS employees designated to travel to our headquarters and assist with the communication aspect of a BSE outbreak only two of us are involved with the TSEs on a nearly full time basis. The others are those in APHIS which have experience working with scrapie, CWD or BSE prevention and surveillance policy. They work either in the field, at headquarters, at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) or the Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH). Their duties include all of our other programs such as preventing the entry of other foreign animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth, Classical Swine Fever, etc., tuberculosis, brucellosis, pseudorabies (etc) eradication, regulating the importation of animals and animal products, facilitating the exportation of healthy animals and safe animal products, as well as the oversight of the veterinary accreditation program. Our webpage at www.aphis.usda.gov can provide you with more detailed information on the multitude of tasks and complexities involved with the APHIS mission.


Linda A. Detwiler
Senior Staff Veterinarian


======================================================================


Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Approved-By: tom
Message-ID:
Date: Sun, 16 May 1999 21:21:34 -0800
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
From: tom
Subject: Re: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room
In-Reply-To: <"990514144119Z.WT11141.

>"The updated BSE Response Plan has been posted on the APHIS website for months. It was also distributed to the contact list which includes other government agencies, industry and consumer groups. I would hardly call it an internal document. I will only address one of the many misinterpretations in Tom Pringle's posting: In the event of a BSE case, the person assigned to monitoring the APHIS BSE website will keep this site up to date on an almost hourly basis, there is no intention of monitoring the sites of others. If anyone has questions about the document I can be reached as follows:
>
>Linda A. Detwiler
>Senior Staff Veterinarian
>USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services
>609-259-5825"
>

Yes, I had four questions:

1. Could you please post on this listserve or the APHIS site the contact list of industry and consumer groups? My concern is that these are not bona fide consumer groups but simply industry-funded shells. It is important as a tax-supported public agency for USDA to promote a level informational playing field.

2. How do I go about getting my name added to this contact list to receive future messages?

3. Could you please post here a list of the "select industry and trading partners" that get the one-day advance warning that mad cow disease has been confirmed in the US? There are many stakeholders in this issue including public health and consumer interests -- I am hoping this list will demonstrate balance. Please add my stockbroker to this list.

4. Could you please post here copies of the press releases that have been made up in advance of this hypothetical event? The facts are not in, how it is possible to issue reassurances to the consumer already? Maybe the actual event won't be all that reassuring.

Thanks,
Tom


===================================================

END TSS/2006

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

correct spelling ;


"dentition"


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OFO/TSC/bse_information.htm


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/5-04.htm


http://www.ianrpubs.unl.edu/epublic/live/nf593/build/nf593.pdf


> But U.S. Department of Agriculture officials believe the cow was at least
> 10 years old


these are the same folks that said that Texas cow was negative for 7+ months
too, until the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around
Johanns/Dehaven et al. Maybe she could get the age of this cow determined as
well via Weybridge.................TSS


----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 9:48 AM
Subject: Re: ALABAMA BSE UPDATE March 30, 2006 - Senate Passes Animal ID
Bill (BSE) and FDA says impossible to indentify feed source


> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> > i dont believe them. you can do test on the teeth to determine how old
> they are, better than detention.
> > where is the head??? show me the data, this is what others should be
> asking. ...
>
>
> HOW is it in the UK they can determine the age of a cow by blood test, but
> here in the USA, we use a draconian pre-historic detention method $$$
>
>
> Farmer flouted BSE laws over ageing cattle
>
> Mar 31 2006
>
>
> Chester Chronicle
>
>
> BEEF cattle older than the two-and-a-half-year legal age limit entered the
> food chain because a farmer put false dates of birth on their passports, a
> court heard.
>
> The farmer, 34-year-old Stephen Kenneth Bourne, ended up with a £10,000
> court bill after he admitted applying false descriptions to a dozen
animals
> which were sold illegally contravening laws designed to combat 'Mad Cow'
> disease .
>
> He was paid £500 to £600 for some of the animals when, because of their
age,
> they were worthless, Mold Crown Court was told on Tuesday.
>
> Bourne of Glan Deg Farm at Threapwood, Malpas, admitted 12 charges brought
> by trading standards officials and was given a two-year conditional
> discharge.
>
> But he was ordered to pay £10,000 in costs at £500 a month.
>
> The two-and-a-half-year age limit on animals being sold in the market was
> introduced to protect the integrity of Britain's beef industry in Europe
> following the BSE scare.
>
>
> The judge, Mr Recorder Rhys Rowlands, said that public confidence in the
> farming industry was crucial for the future of the business.
>
>
> The judge said he took into account that the offences took place over a
six
> month period back in 2003 when he farmed in partnership with his father,
who
> was originally charged as well but who had since died.
>
>
> Prosecuting barrister Julian Shaw said the case arose out of the failure
of
> Bourne and his father to keep any adequate records over the dates of birth
> of cattle on the farm, the identity of dams, and there were no proper
cattle
> movement records.
>
>
> 'There is no way of knowing how many bovines over the 30-month age limit
wer
> e in fact introduced into the food chain,' he said.
>
>
> The case came to a light after vet Gavin Morris became suspicious about an
> animal said to be 25 months but which looked considerably older.
>
>
> Blood specimens were taken of animals at the farm and Britain's leading
> expert in the ageing of cattle by identification Prof Andrew Andrews was
> drafted in.
>
>
> Defending barrister John Wyn Williams said Bourne had inherited the system
> from his father, but he had since ensured that proper computerised records
> were kept and there would not be a repetition.
>
>
> The defendant's late father, Kenneth Huxley Bourne, 65, who died in
November
> of last year, had during the investigation repaid the money he had
received
> from purchasers.
>
>
>
http://iccheshireonline.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/chesterchronicle/tm_objecti
>
d=16886034%26method=full%26siteid=50020%26headline=farmer%2dflouted%2dbse%2d
> laws%2dover%2dageing%2dcattle%2d-name_page.html
>
>
> TSS
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2006 9:32 PM
> Subject: ALABAMA BSE UPDATE March 30, 2006 - Senate Passes Animal ID Bill
> (BSE) and FDA says impossible to indentify feed source
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
>
> March 30, 2006 - Senate Passes Animal ID Bill (BSE)
> MONTGOMERY – Commissioner Ron Sparks and State Veterinarian Dr. Tony
Frazier
> with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries (ADAI) and the
> USDA have provided an update on their ongoing joint investigation of the
cow
> that died from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Alabama.
>
>
>
> March 30, 2006 - Senate Passes Animal ID Bill (BSE)
>
> Today, the Alabama State Senate passed HB 254 with a vote of 20-6. This
bill
> will provide for the confidentiality of information initially gathered by
> the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries as the department
> implements and maintains a database for Animal Identification in accord
and
> consistent with the United States Department of Agriculture's National
> Animal Identification System. Premises ID Registration has been
implemented
> in the last year and Animal ID Registration is not far behind. The
> information on premises and animals, gathered at the request of
Commissioner
> Sparks, is to protect the interest of public health, safety, and welfare.
>
>
>
> “The Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries’ system will comply
with
> any USDA policies and we will not implement an animal ID system that would
> hurt Alabama farmers whether they raise 2 animals or 2,000 animals,” said
> Sparks. “I truly appreciate what the legislature has done for the farmers
> and consumers of Alabama.”
>
> As of today, 14 locations and 44 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 39 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. This process is to eliminate herds from
> the ongoing investigation.
>
> A flow chart showing how the traceback process is progressing has been
> posted on the Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries website
> www.agi.alabama.gov. As the chart illustrates, the investigation has
> broadened to include many farms and stockyards. The farms are where the
> index cow may have lived previously or where her immediate family members
> may have lived. The stockyards are places where investigators have
reviewed
> records of transactions and conducted interviews. Each link is being
> thoroughly examined and then, based on the information collected the link
> will either continue on to another location or be closed.
>
> Federal and state officials have stressed that it may not be possible to
> trace the index cow to her herd of origin due to the primitive traceback
> methods being used in the investigation. Eventually, leads in the case may
> be exhausted despite their best efforts.
>
> The next update from ADAI will be sent Monday, April 3rd.
>
>
>
>
http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/march-30-2006---senate-passes-anim
> al-id-bill-bse?pn=2
>
>
>
> Alabama BSE Case Trace Investigation March 29, 2006 chart
>
>
>
>
http://www.agi.state.al.us/uploads/wU/tL/wUtLnjRP_GE4XN_SybLv6Q/External-BSE
> -Chart.pdf
>
>
>
> Epidemiology Updates
>
> March 30, 2006
> As of today, 14 locations and 44 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 39 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. A location includes stockyards or farms
> where the index cow lived previously or where her immediate family members
> may have lived. The movements include any arrivals or departures from
those
> locations.
>
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
>
>
>
> FDA: US Won't Likely Find Source Of Latest BSE Infection
>
>
>
> WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Government investigators looking into the latest
> case of mad-cow disease in the U.S. won't likely be able to find the
source
> of the cow's infection, a Food and Drug Administration official said
> Thursday.
>
>
>
> Stephen Sundlof, director of FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine, told
> reporters, "It's going to be nearly impossible to identify any particular
> feed."
>
>
>
> Mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, is believed to be
> spread among cattle through feed containing infected cattle parts. The FDA
> has prohibited bovine material from being included in cattle feed since
> 1997.
>
>
>
> If FDA could find the producer of the tainted feed that infected the cow -
> found on an Alabama farm earlier this month - it might be able to find how
> widely the feed was distributed.
>
>
>
> But U.S. Department of Agriculture officials believe the cow was at least
10
> years old when she was euthanized by a local veterinarian on the Alabama
> farm where she had resided for less than a year.
>
> snip...full text;
>
>
>
> http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=26643
>
>
>
> > But U.S. Department of Agriculture officials believe the cow was at
least
> 10 years old
>
>
> yea, and they believed no mad cows were not in the USA either. wrong! and
i
> can list many other things they believed about human and animal TSE that
> they were wrong about, but i have listed them here before.
>
> i dont believe them. you can do test on the teeth to determine how old
they
> are, better than detention. where is the head??? show me the data, this is
> what others should be asking. ...
>
>
>
> TSS
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> ####################

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Epidemiology Updates

March 29, 2006
As of today, 14 locations and 44 movements of cattle have been examined with
34 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
locations and herds will continue. A location includes stockyards or farms
where the index cow lived previously or where her immediate family members
may have lived. The movements include any arrivals or departures from those
locations.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml

THE SILENCE IS DEAFENING...TSS

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Wednesday, March 29, 2006 9:45 AM
Subject: Re: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 24, 2006


> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> Epidemiology Updates
>
> March 28, 2006
> As of today, 14 locations and 44 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 32 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. A location includes stockyards or farms
> where the index cow lived previously or where her immediate family members
> may have lived. The movements include any arrivals or departures from
those
> locations.
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
>
>
> TSS
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2006 8:45 AM
> Subject: Re: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 24, 2006
>
>
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
> >
> > Epidemiology Updates
> >
> > March 27, 2006
> > As of today, 14 locations and 40 movements of cattle have been examined
> with
> > 32 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> > locations and herds will continue. A location includes stockyards or
farms
> > where the index cow lived previously or where her immediate family
members
> > may have lived. The movements include any arrivals or departures from
> those
> > locations. Additional investigations of locations and herds will
continue.
> >
> >
> >
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
> >
> >
> > TSS
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > To:
> > Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2006 12:45 PM
> > Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 24, 2006
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> >
> > Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 24, 2006
> > Date: March 25, 2006 at 10:15 am PST
> >
> > March 24, 2006 - BSE Update
> > MONTGOMERY – Commissioner Ron Sparks and State Veterinarian Dr. Tony
> Frazier
> > with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries (ADAI) and the
> > USDA have provided an update on their ongoing joint investigation of the
> cow
> > that died from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Alabama.
> >
> >
> > March 24, 2006 - BSE Update
> >
> > Since the investigation began, the ADAI and the USDA have followed
> multiple
> > leads in the traceback process. At this time, 13 locations and 32
> movements
> > of cattle have been examined with 27 of those being substantially
> completed.
> > Additional investigations of locations and herds will continue. In
> addition,
> > state and federal officials have confirmed that a black bull calf was
born
> > in 2005 to the index animal (the red cow). The calf was taken by the
owner
> > to a local stockyard in July 2005 where the calf died. The calf was
> disposed
> > of in a local landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
> >
> > Without a premises or animal ID program in place, the traceback process
to
> > find the herd of origin of the index cow is time-consuming and
difficult.
> It
> > includes conducting interviews, reviewing of records and documents, and
> > testing of cattle DNA. State and federal officials have discovered
several
> > herds of interest and they are planning to use DNA testing to determine
> DNA
> > linkage between the index cow and the herds. Through the DNA testing of
> > these herds, investigators will attempt to find a genetic path that
could
> > lead to the herd of origin. Commissioner Sparks stressed that the DNA
> > testing being conducted on the herds is for genetic markers and is not a
> > test for the disease BSE.
> >
> > As part of the thorough investigative process, a large number of cattle
> may
> > be tested in this phase and the number of herds included will continue
to
> > grow as the traceback progresses. Leads will be followed by state and
> > federal officials until they are exhausted. Even when an index animal is
> > traced to it’s birth herd, often cohorts of that animal are no longer in
> > that herd. In addition, even if an animal’s cohort has been exposed to
the
> > same infective material in feed, the other animals will not necessarily
> > contract BSE.
> >
> > BSE is not a contagious disease that spreads animal to animal, or animal
> to
> > human. BSE spreads in cattle through the consumption of feed containing
> > specified risk material (brain and spinal cord) derived from BSE
infected
> > cattle. The United States banned the use of such protein supplements in
> > cattle feed since 1997. Sparks says that beef consumption in this
country
> is
> > safe and there are measures in place to see that it continues to be
safe.
> > For example, downer animals are not allowed to enter commerce for human
> > consumption and there is a ban on feeding ruminant derived protein to
> > cattle.
> >
> >
> >
http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/march-24-2006---bse-update2?pn=2
> >
> >
> >
> >
==========================================================================
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006
> > As of today, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined
> with
> > 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> > locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal
> officials
> > have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index
animal
> > (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in
> July
> > 2005 where the calf died. The calf was appropriately disposed of in a
> local
> > landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local
> > > landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
> >
> >
> > meanwhile, back at the ranch with larry, curly and mo heading up the
USDA
> et
> > al,
> > what would you expect, nothing less than shoot, shovel and shut the hell
> up.
> > no mad cow in USA, feed ban working, no civil war in Iraq either.
> >
> >
> > but what has past history shown us, evidently it has shown the USDA et
al
> > nothing ;
> >
> >
> > Disposal of meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from specified risk
material
> > (SRM) and over thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill
> > The Committee was asked to consider a quantitative risk assessment of
the
> > disposal of meat and bone meal derived from specified risk material and
> over
> > thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill, prepared in response to a
> request
> > from the Committee at its June 1999 meeting.
> >
> > The Committee was asked whether, in the light of the results of the risk
> > assessment, it held to its earlier published (June 1999) view that
> landfill
> > was an acceptable outlet for MBM of any origin, although it retained a
> > preference for incineration. The Committee reiterated that it had a
strong
> > preference for incineration as the favoured route for the disposal of
MBM
> > and were uneasy about the use of landfill for the disposal of this
> material.
> > If there were cases where incineration was not practical the Committee
> felt
> > it would be preferable for any material going to landfill to be
> > pressure-cooked first or possibly stored above ground prior to
> incineration.
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/summ_0700.htm
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Disposal of BSE suspect carcases
> > It is the Department's policy to dispose of BSE suspects by incineration
> > wherever feasible. No BSE suspect carcases have been landfilled since
> 1991.
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/publichealth/notification.html#disp
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > OPINION ON
> >
> > THE USE OF BURIAL FOR DEALING WITH ANIMAL
> >
> > CARCASSES AND OTHER ANIMAL MATERIALS THAT
> >
> > MIGHT CONTAIN BSE/TSE
> >
> > ADOPTED BY THE
> >
> > SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE
> >
> > MEETING OF 16-17 JANUARY 2003
> >
> > The details of the SSC’s evaluation are provided in the attached report.
> The
> > SSC
> >
> > concludes as follows:
> >
> > (1) The term “burial” includes a diversity of disposal conditions.
> Although
> > burial is
> >
> > widely used for disposal of waste the degradation process essential for
> > BSE/TSE
> >
> > infectivity reduction is very difficult to control. The extent to which
> such
> > an
> >
> > infectivity reduction can occur as a consequence of burial is poorly
> > characterised.
> >
> > It would appear to be a slow process in various circumstances.
> >
> > (2) A number of concerns have been identified including potential for
> > groundwater
> >
> > contamination, dispersal/transmission by birds/animals/insects,
accidental
> >
> > uncovering by man.
> >
> > (3) In the absence of any new data the SSC confirms its previous opinion
> > that animal
> >
> > material which could possibly be contaminated with BSE/TSEs, burial
poses
> a
> >
> > risk except under highly controlled conditions (e.g., controlled
> landfill).
> >
> > SNIP...
> >
> > 4. CONCLUSION
> >
> > In the absence of new evidence the opinion of the SSC “Opinion on Fallen
> > Stock”
> >
> > (SSC 25th June 1999) must be endorsed strongly that land burial of all
> > animals and
> >
> > material derived from them for which there is a possibility that they
> could
> >
> > incorporate BSE/TSEs poses a significant risk. Only in exceptional
> > circumstances
> >
> > where there could be a considerable delay in implementing a safe means
of
> > disposal
> >
> > should burial of such materials be considered. Guidelines should be made
> > available
> >
> > to aid on burial site selection.
> >
> > 4 PAGES;
> >
> >
> >
> > http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out309_en.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, the
> >
> > Department of Health prepared a rapid qualitative
> >
> > assessment of the potential risks to human health
> >
> > associated with various methods of carcass disposal
> >
> > (UK Department of Health, 2001c). The most
> >
> > relevant hazards to human health resulting from
> >
> > burial were identified as bacteria pathogenic to
> >
> > humans, water-borne protozoa, and BSE. The main
> >
> > potential route identified was contaminated water
> >
> > supplies, and the report generally concluded that an
> >
> > engineered licensed landfill would always be
> >
> > preferable to unlined burial. In general terms, the
> >
> > findings of the qualitative assessment relative to
> >
> > biological agents are summarized in Table 13.
> >
> > TABLE 13. Potential health hazards and associated pathways of exposure
> > resulting from landfill or burial of
> >
> > animal carcasses (adapted from UK Department of Health, 2001c).
> >
> > PLEASE SEE TABLE AT;
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/research/books/carcassdispfiles/PDF%20Fi
> > les/CH%201%20-%20Burial.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> > PART 2
> >
> > Rendering and fixed-facility incineration were
> >
> > preferred, but the necessary resources were not
> >
> > immediately available and UK officials soon learned
> >
> > that the capacity would only cover a portion of the
> >
> > disposal needs. Disposal in commercial landfills was
> >
> > seen as the next best environmental solution, but
> >
> > legal, commercial, and local community problems
> >
> > limited landfill use. With these limitations in mind,
> >
> > pyre burning was the actual initial method used but
> >
> > was subsequently discontinued following increasing
> >
> > public, scientific, and political concerns. Mass burial
> >
> > and on-farm burial were last on the preferred
> >
> > method list due to the complicating matter of bovine
> >
> > spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and the risk posed
> >
> > to groundwater (Hickman & Hughes, 2002).
> >
> >
> >
>
http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/research/books/carcassdispfiles/PDF%20Fi
> >
>
les/Introduction%20to%20Part%202%20-%20Cross-Cutting%20&%20Policy%20Issues.p
> > df
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Carcase disposal:
> >
> > A Major Problem of the
> >
> > 2001 FMD Outbreak
> >
> > Gordon Hickman and Neil Hughes, Disposal Cell,
> >
> > FMD Joint Co-ordination Centre, Page Street
> >
> > snip...
> >
> >
> > http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/svj/fmd/pages27-40.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> > 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
> > was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
> > the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and
> thought
> > this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all
costs_...
> >
> > snip...
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac07/tab03.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -
> >
> > Confidential!!!!
> >
> > As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small
> > pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station
> > associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland.
> > Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both
> > heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures
> > free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness
> > each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie
> > free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also
> > broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that
TSE
> > contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!!
> > A very frightening revelation!!!
> >
> > ----------
> >
> > more here ;
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s018.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > INCINERATION TEMPS
> >
> > Requirements include:
> >
> > a. after burning to the range of 800 to 1000*C to eliminate smell;
> >
> > well heck, this is just typical public relations fear factor control.
> > do you actually think they would spend the extra costs for fuel,
> > for such extreme heat, just to eliminate smell, when they spread
> > manure all over your veg's. i think not. what they really meant were
> > any _TSE agents_.
> >
> > b. Gas scrubbing to eliminate smoke -- though steam may be omitted;
> >
> > c. Stacks to be fitted with grit arreaters;
> >
> > snip...
> >
> > 1.2 Visual Imact
> >
> > It is considered that the requirement for any carcase incinerator
> > disign would be to ensure that the operations relating to the reception,
> > storage and decepitation of diseased carcasses must not be publicly
> > visible and that any part of a carcase could not be removed or
> > interfered with by animals or birds.
> >
> > full text;
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/04/03006001.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out311_en.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > also, if one thinks that cattle don't become infected with BSE under 30
> > months, well that simplys is not correct.
> >
> > youngest to date is 20 months, with many more in the 20 to 30 month
range
> > not only in the UK but Japan as well. ...
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
> > Bacliff, Texas USA
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> > ####################





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