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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD COW DISEASE
Date: January 14, 2006 at 7:09 am PST

In Reply to: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD COW DISEASE posted by TSS on January 11, 2006 at 9:27 am:

Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a
pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD
COW DISEASE
Date: January 11, 2006 at 9:27 am PST



pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp.
9 December 2005


snip...


9 December 2005
Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)
Food and Drug Administration
5630 Fishers Lane
Room 1061
Rockville, MD 20852
Re: Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273)
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed
Dear Sir or Madame:
Serologicals Corporation is a global provider of biological products to life
science companies.
The Company’s products are essential for the research, development and
manufacturing of
biologically based diagnostic, pharmaceutical and biological products.
customers include
many of the leading research institutions, diagnostic and pharmaceutical
companies throughout
the world. The Company’s products and technologies are used in a wide
variety of applications
within the areas of neurobiology, cell signaling, oncology, angiogenesis,
apoptosis,
developmental biology, cellular physiology, hematology, immunology,
cardiology, infectious
diseases and molecular biology.
A number of our products are derived from bovine blood or other bovine
tissues sourced in the
United States, hence the overall health of the national herd is extremely
important to our
company as well as to our customers and their patients. Some of our bovine
based products are
used in the manufacture of vaccines and drugs for humans, hence it is
critical that all measures
are taken to assure these are safe and free from disease especially Bovine
Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE). The most effective way to insure this is to create a
system which
processes cattle that are BSE free. ...

snip...

The current proposed rule falls short of this and would still leave a
potential source of infectivity
in the system. In fact by the FDA’s own statement the exempted tissues which
are known to
have infectivity (such as distal ileum, DRGs, etc) would cumulatively amount
to 10% of the
infectivity in an infected animal, This proposed rule would still allow for
the possibility that
cattle could be exposed to BSE through:
1. Feeding of materials currently subject to legal exemptions from the ban
(e.g., poultry
litter, plate waste)
2. Cross feeding (the feeding of non-ruminant rations to ruminants) on
farms; and
3. Cross contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant feed
We are most concerned that the FDA has chosen to include a provision which
would allow
tissues from deadstock into the feed chain. We do not support the provision
to allow the removal
of brain and spinal cord from down and deadstock over 30 months of age for
several reasons.
These are the animals with the highest level of infectivity in tissues which
include more than
brain and spinal cord. We do not feel that there can be adequate removal and
enforcement of this
regulation especially during warmer weather. In addition there is emerging
information that at
end stage disease, infectivity may also be included in additionai tissues
such as peripheral nerves
(Buschmann and Groschup, 2005).
Leaving the tissues from these cattle in the animal feed chain will
effectively nullify the intent of
this regulation. This point is illustrated by the 2001 Harvard risk
assessment model which
demonstrated that eliminating dead and downer, 4D cattle, from the feed
stream was a
disproportionately effective means of reducing the risk of re-infection “The
disposition of c&e
that die on the farm would also have a substantial influence on the spread
of BSE if the disease
were in traduced. ...

snip...

Respectfully,
SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION
James J. Kramer, Ph.D.
Vice President, Corporate Operations


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf



TSS 2001

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#########

Greetings List Members,

I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference
call today and even managed to ask a question.
that is when the trouble started.

I submitted a version of my notes to
Sandra Blakeslee of the New York Times,
whom seemed very upset, and rightly
so.

"They tell me it is a closed meeting and
they will release whatever information
they deem fit. Rather infuriating."

and i would have been doing just fine,
until i asked my question. i was surprised
my time to ask a question so quick.

(understand, these are taken from my notes for now.
the spelling of names and such could be off.)

[host Richard Barns]
and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of
CJD Watch.

[TSS]
yes, thank you,
U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you
give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground,
mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question
again.]

[host Richard]
could you repeat the question?

[TSS]
U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you
give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this]
what group are you with?

[TSS]
CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are
tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking]
could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS]
you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking]
NO

from this point, i was still connected, got to listen
and tape the whole conference. at one point someone
came on, a woman, and ask again;

[unknown woman]
what group are you with?

[TSS]
CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD
we are trying to tract down CJD and other
human TSE's world wide. i was invited to
sit in on this from someone inside the USDA/APHIS
and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning
me from this conference now?

at this point the conference was turned back up,
and i got to finish listening. They never answered
or even addressed my one question, or even addressed
the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down
for now, of the conference.

IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my
notes, BUT PLEASE do not depend on them. ask for
transcript from;

RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV
301-827-6906

he would be glad to give you one ;-)

Rockville Maryland,
Richard Barns Host

BSE issues in the U.S.,
How they were labelling ruminant feed?
Revising issues.

The conference opened up with the explaining of
the U.K. BSE epidemic winding down with about 30
cases a week.

although new cases in other countries were now
appearing.

Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE.

BSE increasing across Europe.

Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product,
heightened interest in U.S.

A recent statement in Washington Post, said the
New Administration (old GW) has a list of issues.
BSE is one of the issues.

BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater
interest in MBM not to enter U.S.

HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S.
it would be economically disastrous
to the render, feed, cattle, industries,
and for human health.

(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now
jot down some figures in
which they told you, 'no need to write them down'.
just hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope
i don't ???)

80% inspection of rendering

*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT
occurred.

sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION,
have not been reinspected (70% to 80%).

Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K.
and other European Firms.

Gloria Dunason
Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance.
This _did not_ occur. Mixed level of compliance,
depending on firm.

Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license

system in place for home rendering & feed
76% in compliance
79% cross contamination
21% DID NOT have system
92% record keeping
less than 60% total compliance

279 inspectors
185 handling prohibited materials

Renderer at top of pyramid, significant
part of compliance.
84% compliance

failed to have caution statement render
72% compliance & cross contamination
caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE'

56 FIRMS NEVER INSPECTED

1240 FDA license feed mills
846 inspected

"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected"

80% compliance for feed.

10% don't have system.

NON-FDA licensed mills
There is NO inventory on non licensed mills.
approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ???
4,344 ever inspected.
"FDA does not have a lot of experience with"

40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'.

74% Commingling compliance

"This industry needs a lot of work and only half
gotten to"

"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be
re-inspected, in addition to the 8,000 Firms."

Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end
of January or 30 days, and other states 60 days.
to change feed status??? Contract check and ask
questions and pass info.

At this time, we will take questions.

[I was about the third or fourth to ask question.
then all B.S.eee broke loose, and i lost my train
of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]

someone asking about nutritional supplements and
sourcing, did not get name. something about inspectors
not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference person assuring that Steve
Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were
handling that.

Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions
that did not know what to do???

[Dennis Wilson]
California Food Agr.
Imports, are they looking at imports?

[Conference person]
they are looking at imports,
FDA issued imports Bulletin.

[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in
question, not related i don't think]
Why do we have non-licensed facilities?

(conference person)
other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???

Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson
licensed 400
non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of 6000 to 8000,

(they really don't know how many non licensed Firms
in U.S. they guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS)

Linda Detwiler
asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number,
unless last resort.
(i thought of calling them today, and reporting the
whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not'

Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr.
Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years.
concerned of Firms that have changed
owners.

THE END

TSS

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############

FROM New York TIMES

Subject: Re: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA
Posting of cut version...
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:02:47 -0700
From: "Sandy Blakeslee"
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: 1

Hi terry -- thanks for all your help. I know it made a difference with
the FDA getting out that release.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 2:06 PM
Subject: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA
Posting of cut version...

> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8219.html

> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8220.html


> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8221.html


> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8222.html

> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8230.html


>
> hi sandy,

>From the New York Times NYTimes.com, January 11, 2001

Many Makers of Feed Fail to Heed Rules on Mad Cow Disease
By SANDRA BLAKESLEE

Large numbers of companies involved in manufacturing animal feed are not
complying with regulations meant to prevent the
emergence and spread of mad cow disease in the United States, the Food
and Drug Administration said yesterday.

The widespread failure of companies to follow the regulations, adopted
in August 1997, does not mean that the American food supply is unsafe,
Dr. Stephen Sundlof, director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine at
the F.D.A., said in an interview.

But much more needs to be done to ensure that mad cow disease does not
arise in this country, Dr. Sundlof said.

The regulations state that feed manufacturers and companies that render
slaughtered animals into useful products generally may not feed mammals
to cud-chewing animals, or ruminants, which can carry mad cow disease.

All products that contain rendered cattle or sheep must have a label
that says, "Do not feed to ruminants," Dr. Sundlof said. Manufacturers
must also have a system to prevent ruminant products from being
commingled with other rendered material like that from chicken, fish or
pork. Finally, all companies must keep records of where their products
originated and where they were sold.

Under the regulations, F.D.A. district offices and state veterinary
offices were required to inspect all rendering plants and feed mills to
make sure companies complied. But results issued yesterday demonstrate
that more than three years later, different segments of the feed
industry show varying levels of compliance.

Among 180 large companies that render cattle and another ruminant,
sheep, nearly a quarter were not properly labeling their products and
did not have a system to prevent commingling, the F.D.A. said. And among
347 F.D.A.-licensed feed mills that handle ruminant materials - these
tend to be large operators that mix drugs into their products - 20
percent were not using labels with the required caution statement, and
25 percent did not have a system to prevent commingling.

Then there are some 6,000 to 8,000 feed mills so small they do not
require F.D.A. licenses. They are nonetheless subject
to the regulations, and of 1,593 small feed producers that handle
ruminant material and have been inspected, 40 percent
were not using approved labels and 25 percent had no system in place to
prevent commingling.

On the other hand, fewer than 10 percent of companies, big and small,
were failing to comply with the record-keeping
regulations.

The American Feed Industry Association in Arlington, Va., did not return
phone calls seeking comment.

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/science/11COW.html

Subject:
USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL
Jan. 9, 2001
Date:
Wed, 10 Jan 2001 14:04:21 -0500
From:
"Gomez, Thomas M."
Reply-To:
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To:
BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de


######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#########

USDA/APHIS would like to provide clarification on the following point
from
Mr. Singeltary's 9 Jan posting regarding the 50 state conference call.

[Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number,
unless
last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole
damn
U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not']

Dr. Detwiler was responding to an announcement made during the call to
use
the FDA emergency number if anyone wanted to report a cow with signs
suspect
for BSE. Mr. Singeltary is correct that Dr. Detwiler asked participants
to
use the FDA emergency number as a last resort to report cattle suspect
for
BSE. What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide the List with Dr.
Detwiler's entire statement. Surveillance for BSE in the United States
is a
cooperative effort between states, producers, private veterinarians,
veterinary hospitals and the USDA. The system has been in place for
over 10
years. Each state has a system in place wherein cases are reported to
either the State Veterinarian, the federal Veterinarian in Charge or
through
the veterinary diagnostic laboratory system. The states also have
provisions with emergency numbers. Dr. Detwiler asked participants to
use
the systems currently in place to avoid the possibility of a BSE-suspect
report falling through the cracks. Use of the FDA emergency number has
not
been established as a means to report diseased cattle of any nature.

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############

Subject:
Re: USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE
CALL Jan.9, 2001
Date:
Wed, 10 Jan 2001 13:44:49 -0800
From:
"Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To:
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To:
BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
References:
1


######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#########

Hello Mr. Thomas,

> What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide
> the List with Dr. Detwiler's entire statement.

would you and the USDA/APHIS be so kind as to supply
this list with a full text version of the conference
call and or post on your web-site?
if so when, and thank you.
if not, why not?

> The system has been in place for over 10 years.

that seems to be a very long time for a system to be in
place, and only test 10,700 cattle from some 1.5 BILLION head (including
calf crop). Especially since French
are testing some 20,000 weekly and the E.U. as a whole,
are testing many many more than the U.S., with less
cattle, same risk of BSE/TSEs.

Why does the U.S. insist on not doing massive testing
with the tests which the E.U. are using?
Why is this, please explain?

Please tell me why my question was not answered?

> U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you
> give for serum or tissue donor herds?

It was a very simple question, a very important
question, one that pertained to the topic of
BSE/feed, and asked in a very diplomatic way.
why was it not answered?

If all these years, we have been hearing that
pharmaceutical grade bovines were raised for
pharmaceuticals vaccines etc. But yet the
USA cannot comply with feed regulations of
the ruminant feed ban, PLUS cannot even
comply with the proper labelling of the feed,
cross contamination etc.
Then how in the world can you Guarantee the feed
fed to pharmaceutical grade bovine, were actually
non ruminant feed?

Before i was ask to be 'disconnected',
i did hear someone in the background
say 'we can't'-- have him ask the question again.

could you please be so kind, as to answer these
questions?

thank you,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA

P.S. if you will also notice, i did not post that
emergency phone number and do not intend on passing
it on to anyone. I was joking when i said i should
call and report the whole damn U.S. Herd. So please
pass that on to Dr. Detwiler, so she can rest easily.

BUT, they should be reported, some are infected with TSE.
The U.S. is just acting as stupid as Germany and other
Countries that insist they are free of BSE.

TSS

Subject: Report on the assessment of the Georgraphical BSE-risk of the
USA July 2000 (not good)
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 21:23:51 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#########

Greetings List Members and ALL EU Countries,

Because of this report, and the recent findings
of the 50-state BSE Conference call, I respectfully
seriously suggest that these Countries and the SSC
re-evaluate the U.S.A. G.B.R. to a risk factor of #3.

I attempted to post this to list in full text,
but would not accept...

thank you,
kind regards,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000

PART II

REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE
RISK OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- 29 -

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely
but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

Stability: Before 1990 the system was extremely unstable because feeding
of MBM to cattle happened, rendering was inappropriate with regard to
deactivation of the BSE-agent and SRM and fallen stock were rendered for
feed. From 1990 to 1997 it improved to very unstable, thanks to efforts
undertaken to trace imported animals and exclude them from the feed
chain and intensive surveillance. In 1998 the system became neutrally
stable after the RMBM-ban of 1997.

External challenges: A moderate external challenge occurred in the
period before 1990 because of importation of live animals from
BSE-affected countries, in particular from the UK and Ireland. It cannot
be excluded that some BSE-infected animals have been imported by this
route and did enter the US rendering and feed production system. The
efforts undertaken since 1990 to trace back UK-imported cattle and to
exclude them from the feed chain reduced the impact of the external
challenge significantly.

Interaction of external challenges and stability: While extremely
unstable, the US system was exposed to a moderate external challenge,
mainly resulting from cattle imports from the UK. It can not be excluded
that BSE-infectivity entered the country by this route and has been
recycled to domestic cattle. The resulting domestic cases would have
been processed while the system was still very unstable or unstable and
would hence have initiated a number of second or third generation cases.
However, the level of the possible domestic prevalence must be below the
low detection level of the surveillance in place.

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the
probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent will remain at the current level.

JUSTIFICATION

1. DATA

The available information was suitable to carry out the GBR risk
assessment.

- 30 -

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000

2. STABILITY

2.1 Overall appreciation of the ability to identify BSE-cases and to
eliminate animals at risk of being infected before they are processed

· Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and
eliminate) BSE cases was limited.
· Since 1990 this ability is significantly improved, thanks to a
good BSE-surveillance and culling system (contingency plan).
· Today the surveillance should be able to detect clinical
BSE-cases within the limits set by an essential passive surveillance
system, i.e. some cases might remain undetected.

2.2 Overall appreciation of the ability to avoid recycling
BSE-infectivity, should it enter processing

· Before 1997 the US rendering and feed producing system would not
have been able to avoid recycling of the BSE agent to any measurable
extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced the feed chain, it could
probably have reached cattle.
· After the introduction of the RMBM-to-ruminants-ban in August
1997 the ability of the system to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was
somewhat increased. It is still rather low due to the rendering system
of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) and the persisting
potential for cross-contamination of cattle feed with other feeds and
hence RMBM.

2.3 Overall assessment of the Stability

· Until 1990 the US BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable as
RMBM was commonly fed to cattle, the rendering system was not able to
reduce BSE-infectivity and SRM were rendered. This means that incoming
BSE infectivity would have been most probably recycled to cattle and
amplified and the disease propagated.
· Between 1990 and 1995 improvements in the BSE surveillance and
the efforts to trace back and remove imported cattle gradually improved
the stability but
the system remained very unstable.
In 1998 the system became unstable because of an RMBM-ban introduced in
1997. After 1998 the ban was fully implemented and the system is
regarded to be neutrally stable since 1998. The US system is therefore
seen to neither be able to amplify nor to reduce circulating or incoming
BSE-infectivity.

3. CHALLENGES

A moderate external challenge occurred in the period 1980-1989 because
of importation of live animals from the UK. imports from other countries
are regarded to have been negligible challenges.
· As a consequence of this external challenge, infectivity could
have entered the feed cycle and domestic animals could have been exposed
to the agent. These domestic BSE-incubating animals might have again
entered processing, leading to an internal challenge since 1991.
· This internal challenge could have produced domestic cases of
BSE, yet prevalence levels could have been below the detection limits of
the surveillance system until now. (According to US calculations, the
current surveillance

-31 -

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July
2000

system could detect clinical incidence of 1-3 cases per year per million
adult cattle, i.e. in absolute numbers 43-129 cases per year). Between
1990 und 1995, with the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe
from the feed chain, the effect of the external challenges decreased.

4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS

4.1 Interaction of stability and challenqe

· In the late 80s, early 90s a moderate external challenges met an
extremely unstable system. This would have amplified the incoming
BSE-infectivity and propagated the disease.
· With the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the
feed chain between 1990 and 1995 the effect of the external challenge
decreased.
· Before 1998 an internal challenge, if it developed, would have
met a still unstable system (inappropriate rendering, no SRM ban, RMBM
ban only after 1997) and the BSE-infectivity could have been recycled
and amplified.
· After 1998 the neutrally stable system could still recycle the
BSE-agent but due to the RMBM-ban of 1997 the BSE-infectivity
circulating in the system would probably not be amplified.

4.2 Risk that BSE-infectivity enters processing

· A very low processing risk developed in the late 80s when the
UK-imports were slaughtered or died. It increased until 1990 because of
the higher risk to be infected with BSE of cattle imported from the UK
in 1988/89, as these animals could have been processed prior to the
back-tracing of the UK-imports in 1990.
· From 1990 to 1995 a combination of surviving non-traced UK
imports and some domestic (pre-)clinical cases could have arrived at
processing resulting in an assumed constant low but non-negligible
processing risk.
· After 1995 any processing risk relates to assumed domestic cases
arriving at processing.
· The fact that no domestic cases have been shown-up in the
BSE-surveillance is reassuring - it indicates that BSE is in fact not
present in the country at levels above the detection limits of the
country's surveillance system. This detection level has been calculated
according to US-experts to be between 1 & 3 clinical cases per million
adult cattle per year.

Note: The high turnover in parts of the dairy cattle population with a
young age at slaughter makes it unlikely that fully developed clinical
cases would occur (and could be detected) or enter processing. However,
the theoretical infective load of the pre-clinical BSE-cases that
under this scenario could be processed, can be assumed to remain
relatively low.

4.3 Risk that BSE-infectivity is recycled and propagated

· During the period covered by this assessment (1980-1999) the
US-system was not able to prevent propagation of BSE should it have
entered, even if this ability was significantly improved with the
MBM-ban of 1997.
· However, since the likelihood that BSE-infectivity entered the
system is regarded to be small but non-negligible, the risk that
propagation of the disease
took place is also small but not negligible.

- 32 -

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely
but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

5.2 The expected development of the GBR

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the
probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent remains at the current level.

5.3 Recommendations for influencin.q the future GBR

· As long as the stability of the US system is not significantly
enbanced above neutral levels it remains critically important to avoid
any new external
challenges.
· All measures that would improve the stability of the system, in
particular with regard to its ability to avoid recycling of the
BSE-agent should it be present in the cattle population, would reduce,
over time, the probability that cattle could be infected with the
BSE-agent. Possible actions include:
removal of SRMs and/or fallen stock from rendering, better rendering
processes, improved compliance with the MBM-ban including control and
reduction of cross-contamination.
· Results from an improved intensive surveillance programme,
targeting at risk sub-populations such as adult cattle in fallen stock
or in emergency slaughter, could verify the current assessment.

snip...

FULL TEXT about 16 pages


http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8278.html


http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8279.html

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/index.html

to keep up with this epidemic in both humans and animals,
one that will be with us for years to come, and soon will explain the
many demented people in the U.S.,
please go to;

BSE NEWS
http://www.vegsource.com/wwwboard/lyman/wwwboard.html

CJD Watch
http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm

CJD Watch message board
http://www.InsideTheWeb.com/mbs.cgi/mb172420

Moms death from hvCJD
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7252.html

'MOMS AUTOPSY REPORT'
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7548.html

CJD/BSE aka madcow disease in the U.S., please let me count the Ways$$$
PLEASE READ THIS...


http://www.whale.to/v/cjd2.html

SOMETHING TO CHEW ON

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/8278.html

this message will self destruct in 10 seconds ;-)

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.,
P.O. Box 42, Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
===================================

i wrote that in 2001.......tss





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